


PRESIDENT ELECT

TM



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CREDITS

Nelson Hernandez, Sr.
Game Design/Rules

Roxanne Hernandez
Moral Support

Louis Saekow/Denise Stansfield
Art & Graphic Design

Abracadabra Type
Typesetting

A&a Printing & Lithography
Printing



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I. DESCRIPTION OF PLAY

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

PRESIDENT-ELECT is a computer simulation of a presidential campaign from Labor Day to Election Night. The game can be played by up to three players, each assuming the role of campaign manager/candidate. The game proceeds through nine weekly turns, in which the players must decide how to allocate campaign funds. Weekly polls are provided to give the players a rough idea of how they are doing, and to help them determine where to concentrate their campaigning efforts. Candidates may elect to take a trip to a foreign country or may agree to debate their opponents. At the end of the campaign, election returns come in on a minute-to-minute basis until a winner is determined.

B. STARTING A GAME (DOS 3.2 or DOS 3.3)

To begin a game, boot your game disc and the game will begin automatically. If you are using an Apple II with Pascal, you must use your BASICS disc. If you are using an Apple III, you must first go into Apple II emulation mode.

C. SAVING A GAME

Upon Completion of the debate phase, the computer will allow the player(s) to save the game in progress. If you choose to save the game you will need a scratch disc to store the data. The scratch disc must be initialized for SSI use by following the instructions included in the program. Once the game is saved, you will be able to restart it from the point at which you left off.

II. SEQUENCE OF PLAY

A. ADMINISTRATIVE PHASE

1. Select Graphics Mode.

PRESIDENT-ELECT is equipped for black-and-white or color terminals. Select the type you will be using by pressing the "B" or "C" key. You will notice that pressing either key will result in a "beep" and the next question; no "RETURN" is required. Whenever the beep is heard, there is no need to press RETURN.

2. Play, Continue, or Demonstrate Option

Pressing "1" will begin a new game, pressing "2" will begin the procedure for continuing a game that had been previously saved, and pressing "3" will give you a picture of the 1980 Reagan Landslide. Once the picture is complete, hitting any key will begin a new game.

3. Randomize.

Enter any number from 1 to 1000 to seed the random number generator. Decimal numbers are acceptable. It is recommended that a different number be used each game.

4. Select a Scenario.

Comment:

PRESIDENT-ELECT has six historical scenarios and a virtually unlimited number of hypothetical, or ahistorical, scenarios. Though scenarios all begin on Labor Day of the year you select, running for President begins months, even years before then. Sometimes, as in 1964 and 1972, the period of the campaign covered by this game was hardly decisive; for one reason or another, the outcome was never much in doubt.

In selecting or constructing a scenario, you are putting many pieces of

the puzzle into place before the game has even begun. As an illustration, an incumbent seeking re-election while unemployment and inflation are running at 15%, while the economy is in a depression, and while an unpopular war in progress is virtually assured of losing by a historic landslide (or possibly by a bloody revolution), regardless of his campaign efforts. It therefore cannot be overstressed how important the initial variables are in shaping the outcome.

Of the six historical scenarios, only two — the 1960 and 1968 elections — are truly toss-ups. The 1976 and 1980 scenarios slightly favor the Democrats and Republicans, respectively. The 1964 and 1972 scenarios are almost hopelessly lopsided in favor of the parties that historically won those elections. By changing the candidates or historic conditions, the final outcome can be changed anywhere from radically to not at all. However unlikely, conditions can be manipulated to favor a third-party candidate! Even political extremists can find satisfaction in PRESIDENT-ELECT.

Procedure:

(a) Enter Scenario Year. Any election year from 1960 through 1984 is acceptable. Note that the 1984 scenario is automatically ahistorical. The main changes from 1980 are the actual vote counts and the electoral vote alignments (e.g., Florida will have 21 electoral votes versus 17 in 1980).

NOTE: In 1960 the district of Columbia has 0 electoral votes.

(b) Enter Scenario Variables. If you want a historical scenario, press "H". Doing so will automatically load the historical candidates and conditions, and lead you to the next section. Pressing "A" will result in the following questions:

- Enter Democratic Candidate. Type in the last name (only) of the candidate desired. Since history is now irrelevant, you can pit Lyndon Johnson against Ronald Reagan. Or, you can jump party lines and have Barry Goldwater show down Nelson Rockefeller.

Alternatively, you can enter the last name of someone who never was a candidate for president — yourself, for example. You will be required to answer a battery of 25 questions on 1980 issues to deter-



mine that candidate's ideological persuasion. (Note: extremist candidates frighten away voters and are punished accordingly). Following this, the candidate's speaking ability, magnetism, and poise under pressure are gauged. Finally, the candidate's home state is determined.

- Enter Vice-Presidential Candidate's Home State. PRESIDENT-ELECT, much like history, gives the designated running mates the short end of the stick in that they are almost ignored during the game (they are considered to cancel each other out). This is the moment of glory — registering the home regions and states. The presidential candidates will accrue some benefits in the states and regions to which his running mate belongs.

- Enter Republican Candidate and Running Mate. The procedure is repeated.

- Enter Third-Party Candidate. Third-party candidates are optional. They go through the same procedure as major candidates or can be avoided by pressing "RETURN".

- Determine Party in Power. Pressing "R" or "D" will determine which party gets the credit or blame for the way things are and the way they develop during the campaign. Any good news will help the incumbent party's candidate, and bad news will hurt. The only exception is in the event of a "crisis", in which case anything can happen. More on that later.

- Determine if Incumbent is Seeking Election. If an incumbent is seeking election or re-election, he receives the full impact of the situation at hand, be it good or bad. Thus, the incumbency can be either a great asset or a great liability. Usually, the incumbent party will enjoy an advantage, all things being equal. (They never are, though).

- Determine Domestic and Foreign Conditions. If conditions are the same as they were historically, an answer of "Y" will put you in the next section. If anything is to be changed, answer "N". The appropriate inflation, unemployment, and

GNP growth figures must then be entered. Historic figures are provided as a benchmark for comparison and for nostalgic reasons.

The nation may be designated as either at war or at peace. Historically, 1968 and 1972 are considered war years, though Vietnam, by 1972, was no longer alone on the center stage. (Successful trips to China and the Soviet Union made the foreign outlook rather positive, if only for a brief time). By way of comment, it should be noted that the foreign outlook rating in peacetime is not so much the outlook in terms of the actual balance of power, but how the public at large **perceives** the balance of power. For example, Nixon suffered in 1960 due to a completely imaginary "missile gap" dreamed up primarily by Democrats, which, compounded by Sputnik, the Cuban revolution, and virulent bombast by Khrushchev, made our world position appear tenuous at best. Actually, our military predominance was quite overwhelming, as was later shown in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1980, the Iran Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, events over which the U.S. had no control, made the world situation look very bleak — with a devastating impact on the incumbent party.

5. Management Determination.

For each candidate in turn, indicate whether or not he will be computer-managed. All, some, or none of the candidates may be so designated.

Computer-managed candidates make all the campaign decisions a human would, and sometimes with alarming effectiveness. Watching its weekly thrusts may give some hints as to what may be good strategy.

B. CAMPAIGN PHASE

1. Poll and Projection Phase.

Shown will be the percentages pollsters are, on average, giving each of the candidates. The pollsters claim a 2% margin of error on the national poll and a 4% margin of error on individual state polls. The actual error will very seldom exceed these margins, and sometimes will be insignificant. For a state to be

considered slightly leaning towards a candidate, he must have at least a 4% lead in the state. For a state to be considered strongly leaning towards a candidate, he must have a 8% lead in the state. The degree of reliance you place on the polls is strictly a judgemental decision.

Every week, you are likely to notice some shifting of states from one candidate to undecided, or vice versa. In special cases a state may switch abruptly from one candidate to another (very rare occurrence). Changes in state strengths result from current events and the different forms of campaigning. No formulas are available for deciding what the optimal amount of campaigning is in a state; they do not exist. Successful campaigning can come only through a combination of shrewd strategy, judicious spending, and dumb luck.

2. Current Events Phase.

Shown will be unrelated items affecting the campaign in one way or another. Generally, bad news will hurt the incumbent party, and good news will help. The consequences will seldom be of great importance, as voters are notoriously indifferent to monthly unemployment, inflation, or economic statistics. The main effect is cumulative: if the news is unremittingly good or bad, the effect may be important. Candidates have no control of economic events.

Foreign news has the same effect on a campaign as economic news, except that extremely bad news, such as an impending crisis, may serve to unite the country behind the President. Crises rarely occur in the game, but can be rather exciting because so much hinges on how they are resolved.

If one of the candidates is an incumbent president, he will receive a short briefing of what the problem is, and a list of options available. He must select one (presumably the one which will both serve the country best and look good to the voters), and hope the outcome is favorable. The spectrum runs from "overwhelming support" to "strong opposition." If things don't work out . . . well, Napoleon had his Waterloo, Kennedy his Bay of Pigs.

Also shown will be a tally of any campaign gaffes or questionable statements the candidates made in the previous





week — questionable in the opinion of the press, at least. "Gaffes" are defined as things like brazenly lying, mudslinging with malice (as distinguished from merely routine mudslinging), or making a statement that reveals a profound lack of understanding on a fundamental issue (the classic example in recent history is President Ford's stunning "Poland is not under Soviet domination" — akin to saying the Amazon River flows through the United States).

"Questionable statements" are considerably less harmful, and can be described as "small gaffes." Errors of this genre include using an inaccurate statistic or quote in a speech, making a joke in bad taste, or waffling on a minor issue. Generally, errors of both sorts will happen more frequently to candidates with less poise under pressure and those who make more campaign stops (greater exposure to the public and the press, plus fatigue, causes more blunders).

Last, if a candidate or his running mate took a foreign trip in the previous week, a summary of the trip's outcome will be shown. The better the press, the better the effect at home.

3. Trip Scheduling Phase (Week 1 only).

All candidates must decide once and for all if they or their running mates will take a foreign trip. These visits, ostensibly for the purpose of reaching some "understandings" with the host country, are actually primarily for the purpose of getting good press at home, gaining credibility as a statesman, and getting photographed at venerable monuments.

These trips are not inexpensive, except for an incumbent, and can be both risky and time-consuming. However, the benefits of a successful trip outweigh the costs. In effect; they are a gamble. Usually, the riskier the trip (longer, later in the campaign, to less-friendly countries, with the presidential candidate going), the greater the potential benefits. The decision to go or not to go rests with you.

4. Advertising and Campaigning Phase.

Players now rotate at the terminal, each entering his weekly campaign moves secretly. Though the order of entry is invariably Democrat, Republican, and Third-Party, the order is irrelevant;

all campaigning is considered to occur simultaneously.

The screen will display the current week, the number of dollar "units" remaining (\$1 unit is \$1000 for the 1976 and 1980 elections, and may equal more or less for the other elections), the overhead expenses incurred in the current week, and the amount spent thus far in the week. Overhead is automatically deducted at the start of each week, and is unavoidable. This expense does not contribute directly to swaying votes, but is essential to the running of a campaign. It covers a hodge-podge of campaign expenses, such as rents for campaign headquarters, salaries, telephones, literature, and booze for the victory celebration. The expense is abstracted in the game for the sake of simplicity and planning. For major candidates, overhead starts at \$500 units on Week 1 and increases by \$100 units each week until the end of the game. Week 9 expenses, therefore, are \$1300 units. Third-Party candidates have variable overheads. The higher their popularity, the more they are considered to be spending for overhead. Candidates with 1% in the polls will have a very low overhead; serious contenders will pay amounts comparable to the major party candidates. Overhead will rise as the campaign develops, unless the candidate sinks badly in the polls.

There are several ways to spend campaign money, each having a different impact. Well-run campaigns use all methods in the course of a campaign so as to win the most electoral votes in the election. (Winning the popular vote is not the main thing, as Samuel Tilden could have told you).

- **National Advertising.** These are national television ads, speeches, and other promotions that have a national effect. Dollar for dollar, it is least effective in swaying votes in individual states. On the other hand, it covers **every** state, and sways the most net votes, dollar for dollar. Put another way, national advertising will affect the percentages in the polls most directly, but is not as useful in swinging important states, because it is not focused, concentrated. National ads are indispensable in the course of any campaign and should, by the end of the campaign,

represent a significant percentage of total expenses. How significant, of course, is entirely your decision as campaign manager. Sometimes, blitzkrieging the opposition with \$2000-3000 units in national ads in a single week can sow panic on the other side, not to mention boost the overall position. Other times, you may be so strapped for cash that only \$100 units can be spent (it will be a grim week). In any event, it is wise to plan ahead as much as possible, changing plans only when unforeseen circumstances dictate.

National ads have a constant effect. That is, \$1 unit spent on Week 1 will have the same effect for a candidate as \$1 unit on Week 9. However, candidates with more magnetism will have a slight advantage in effect. While the difference is hardly noticeable on a week-to-week basis, over the long haul it is important.

- **Regional Advertising.** As the title implies, these are ads specifically designed to sway the inhabitants of particular regions. For example, ads targeted for the Midwest will have a greater emphasis on farm issues than those of, say, the Mid-Atlantic. Ads in industrial areas will seek to garner the support of both business and labor (especially labor, since it represents more votes).

Only \$300 units may be allocated to any one region in a single week, though this amount could conceivably be allocated to every region. These ads are marginally more effective than national ads, having a more direct impact on all the states of the region. As can be surmised, this form of advertising is best used when an entire region is relatively close or when a candidate wants to mount a blitz in a particular region.

Though regional ads are more effective than national ads, it would be unwise to concentrate exclusively on regional ads, to the neglect of national ads. Regional advertising is more narrow in scope than national advertising, and usually the most effective strategy is to use a combination of both, thereby swinging





both the voters primarily concerned with the regional issues and those concerned with the larger, national ones. This advice is not meant, however, to stifle your creativity; there may well be situations where national advertising would be like using an axe to perform an act of surgery.

• **Individual State Advertising.** This is the narrowest, most effective form of advertising — for swinging a single state. If California is too close to call in the final week, you may see a need to use this form of advertising to help the voters arrive at the correct decision.

To indicate a state where you wish to employ this form of advertising, merely enter that state's postal abbreviation (e.g., "NY" for New York, "CA" for California). You have three opportunities per week to use this form of advertising. You may elect to use all, some, or none. To indicate "no state", press 'RETURN' when asked for which state you want. You may spend up to \$150 units in each of the three states, or you may, if you desire, indicate the same state every time, spending up to \$450 units in a single week for a particular state.

While this advertising is highly effective, it is very "expensive". While \$1 unit of national ads may swing thousands of votes, \$1 unit of individual state ads may swing only hundreds. The power of this tactic is in its concentration. It should be used only in special situations because of its costs. No manager can really afford to mount narrow attacks on a consistent basis: the sacrifices in other areas are too great.

Used in tandem with all other forms of campaigning, this kind of advertising is most effective. First, the manager allocates a healthy amount of national advertising. Then, he spends the maximum for a target region. He follows this up with a good dose of state advertising. Finally, the candidate himself comes in for a few campaign stops. If the region is close and there is no significant opposition, the overall

effect should be very gratifying. Of course, no one can afford to do this too often.

• **Campaign Stops.** Finally, we reach the most publicly noticed and traditional form of campaigning — speeches and appearances by the candidate. This is the most free-wheeling and effective campaign tactic of all, and it takes on greater importance as the game progresses. That is, the effect of a campaign stop increases slightly with each passing week.

There are drawbacks, however. First, the cost of a stop is not inexpensive, as these extravaganzas require much planning, organization, staff work, plus travel for the entire entourage. Second, the candidates are limited by time — (they can make a maximum of 35 stops in a week, less in weeks in which they take trips — and, just as important, their human condition. In other words, even the best of them get tired after a while, becoming more susceptible to gaffes and other ill-considered moves.

On the other hand, as candidates they are expected to actively campaign. Undercampaigning may conserve money, but is viewed dimly by the press and general public. While holding back for a big finish is a fine campaign strategy, it can be overdone. There is no "optimal" number of stops, just as there is no reliable, "scientific" way to run a campaign.

Candidates incur campaigning cost when they elect to go to a region, when they elect to go to a state within a region, and for each stop they make. For example, if a major party candidate wants to make a swing through the Pacific Coast region, making one stop in Oregon, two in Washington, and three in California, he must pay \$45 units for entering the region, \$20 units for each state entered (\$60 units), and \$35 units for each stop, or \$210 units. The total cost of the swing will be \$315 units. Costs are lower for third party candidates, as their appearances tend to be low-budget affairs.

Campaign stops have a diminishing marginal effectiveness. In other words, the difference between making one stop in a state and two will be much greater than the difference between eight and nine. As a rule, it is seldom worth making more than five stops a week in a single state. It is much more effective to revisit a state in following weeks. The additional cost is made up by the better effect.

Candidates with greater magnetism and speaking ability have an edge over their opponents in campaign stops, as in all forms of advertising. Here, however, the edge is more pronounced. A good campaigner is urged to press the campaign home through more stops. Under no circumstances should advertising be neglected, because a candidate cannot speak everywhere at once, but a good speaker should use his edge as much as is practical. Over the course of a campaign, this edge should be manifested in the polls.

5. Intelligence Phase.

Once the last candidate has completed his turn, there will be several beeps. This will signal other players to return to the terminal. When they are all assembled, any key should be pressed to begin the weekly campaign summary. Shown will be the candidates' approximate spending in each region and state for the week just past. Figures are inaccurate by up to 10%, just to keep the players unsure of the exact amount their opponents are spending. The inaccuracy is not enough to hide any states where candidates are making significant efforts. Also listed is the number of stops made by each candidate in each state.

The amount indicated by each state includes overhead, all forms of advertising, and campaign stops. Overhead and national ads are spread around the country, with states having more electoral votes receiving proportionately more. Regional ads and regional campaigning costs are distributed to states within the region, again with larger electoral states receiving proportionately more. Individual state ads and state campaigning costs are added in undiluted form.





The numbers can be misleading if you let them be. You must always remember that different kinds of campaigning have different effects. Overhead, which is included with the figures, is valuable in concept but not in game terms. California, which represented 8.36% of all electoral votes in 1980 (45 of 538), would receive \$83 units of every \$1000 units spent in national ads. However, \$83 units of national advertising is not nearly as effective as \$83 units of campaigning or individual state advertising. In short, the figure is useful as a rough estimate of where the opposing candidates made an effort in the week, and where they didn't. The summary, along with the weekly polls and projections, should give many clues as to opposition strategy, and perhaps suggest what your own strategy should be.

Summary "pages" are viewed until all candidates agree to go on to the next. There is no time limit on the digestion of information.

6. Debate Phase

All candidates, in turn, express their desire to debate or not to debate. This expressed desire has nothing to do with whether the opponent is willing to or not; it merely indicates that the candidate has, during the week, indicated that he would be willing to debate. If a candidate is willing to debate but he knows his opponent is unwilling, he should still indicate his willingness, as he will receive a small sympathy vote for his frustration. This advantage is not large, so unwilling candidates should not feel forced to debate.

Once all candidates have registered their disposition towards debating, the computer checks to see if there are two or more candidates willing. If there are, the candidates must either agree, or not agree, to debate. If any two or more candidates agree, the campaign process is immediately interrupted and a debate takes place. If the candidates cannot agree for some reason, the game proceeds to the next phase.

As an example, if the Republican is unwilling to debate, but the Democratic and Communist candidates are willing, the Democratic and Communist candidates must either agree, or not agree, to debate at once. Agreement comes only by mutual consent; candidates can never

be forced into debating. In this case, since any gain by the Communist would probably cut into the Democrats' constituency (just as a KKK candidate would probably cut into the Republican), the Democrat would probably be best off to flatly refuse.

If one of the candidates needing to agree or disagree is being managed by the computer, then the one human-managed candidate should enter his answer alone. The computer will separately decide whether or not to agree. The decision will be immediately flashed on the screen. Obviously, if the human does not agree, the debate cannot come off.

Debates consist of between two and six questions on 1980 issues with the candidates deciding on the number before the debate begins. (Note: We would have liked to have included questions from every election year, but they take up gobs of disk space.) There are 45 questions possible, on social, economic, and foreign policy issues. Once a question is asked during a campaign, it is never repeated. Consequently, no two debates are exactly alike. Some questions are weightier than others. You must intuitively figure out which ones these are (almost impossible in itself). Each question consists of an initial answer and a rebuttal by all participants. (Three-way debates are possible).

Each candidate is required to enter the percentage of time that will be devoted to each of five possible lines of argument. The distribution is entirely up to the candidates, though no more than 100% of the time allotted may be used. (If you accidentally exceed the limit, the time will be redistributed proportionately to equal 100% — since this is not always desired, don't make the mistake.) The different lines of argument are broad and somewhat ambiguous because, as you can easily realize, the true possibilities in a debate are much larger than those provided. For the sake of playability and programability, the options have been narrowed.

The object of the debate is to out-point your opponents by skillfully allocating time and being lucky enough not to commit mistakes. There are two kinds of points — regular "points" and "intangibles." Regular points are things like damaging (or positive) statistics, well-

stated points of view, or trenchant criticisms of the opponent's position. In short, the use of logic and reason. Intangibles are almost everything else . . . ease of delivery, confidence, general demeanor, sense of humor (if called for), relationship with the viewing audience, and so forth. This is the area in which Kennedy beat Nixon in their first debate, and which Reagan beat Carter in their only debate. Points scored either way are equally important in the final analysis of who "won" and "lost."

Some lines of argument, such as "Discuss Relevant Considerations", "State Own Position", or "Attack Opponent's Position" are more heavily weighted in regular points than intangibles. Others, such as "Kill Time", or "Criticize with Witticisms", are more heavily weighted in intangibles than regular points. The exact relationships we will not divulge; the last thing intended in this game is for someone to methodically calculate what would be the optimum course on a given question. (Theoretically, there is one on every question, but we haven't bothered to figure out exactly what it is.)

There are penalties for overdoing it in some lines of argument. For example, really pasting the opponent with moral indignation will make you look like a hothead, and have detrimental effects. If you kill too much time, you may be loved but not respected. Discussing the considerations too much will make you look like an egghead, and not decisive enough. Contrasting too much will make you appear deferential; too many witticisms, a clown. So . . . read the question carefully, gauge what your opponent might do, and make a gut answer. That is what they do in real life.

Candidates with greater speaking ability and magnetism will generally outpoint their opponents, unless they commit gaffes. If a candidate happens to be strong in one area but weak in another, he should work his strength as much as possible. His advantage may make up for the deficiency.

Some lines of argument are riskier than others when it comes to making a gaffe. The safest line is killing time. The most dangerous (and probably most intellectual) is discussing the relevant considerations. (It is easy to stumble under the intense pressure of a debate.)



The other lines of argument fall somewhere in between. (How we delight in keeping you in the dark!) Gaffes during a debate range from slight to serious. Serious gaffes are calamitous: credibility goes down the drain along with points. Slight gaffes are not fatal: they represent only a slight stumble and can be made up, especially by strong debaters. In addition to risk in the lines of argument chosen, a candidate's poise under pressure comes strongly into play. Someone lacking poise will be eaten alive in a debate, and should avoid such confrontations at all costs.

At the end of a debate, the point tallies are shown. Scoring over 20 points in either category represents a respectable showing in that category. Between 10 and 20 is rather ordinary, and less than 10 is poor. If the number of points scored is a minus figure, the candidate would have been better off gagged.

The total points are then compared, and added to the week's campaigning effects. The game goes on to the next section.

Only one debate is allowed per week; a maximum of six are allowed in a campaign.

7. Save the Game Option.

Games may be saved on separate disks. Make sure you have at least 40 free sectors on a disk before you start a game you think may be saved. The games can be continued by simply indicating your desire after first saving the game. The details of saving a game are listed in the program when a player asks to save a game. To go on to the next phase, merely press "C".

8. Strength Adjustment Phase.

This phase passes in a few seconds, as the computer changes all candidate strengths in each state in accordance with the changes that have occurred during the week. The game proceeds to the Poll and Projection Phase for the start of a new week. If the week just ended is Week 9, the game will proceed to Election Night.

C. ELECTION RETURNS PHASE.

Election coverage begins at 8:00 pm Eastern Standard Time. States will begin reporting returns when the local time is 8:00 pm. That is to say, returns from the

East Coast start at 8:00 pm EST, and returns from the Pacific Coast begin at 11:00 pm EST (8:00 pm local time). The last states to report, Alaska and Hawaii, begin reporting at 2:00 am EST.

Coverage is possible three ways: minute by minute, which is highly realistic but can be a drag for people in a hurry (It takes over 4 hours for all the votes to be counted, in real time, though the winner is usually decided long before then); instantaneous, where you hit the appropriate key and get the final results in seconds; or rapid, where you may have blocks of minutes counted quite quickly, and receive several state projections at once.

States are projected for one candidate or another when, in the opinion of the computer, enough votes have been counted to predict the winner. The closer the state, the longer it will take to project a state. Sometimes, the state will require up to 99% of the vote to be counted, if the election is close enough to warrant it. This system of projections produces very realistic effects. Places like the District of Columbia are usually decided almost immediately — the Democrats have an almost insurmountable advantage there due to the composition of the voters — while close states may take hours to decide.

Running totals are kept of the votes counted and the projected electoral votes received. When a candidate receives enough "projected" electoral votes to win, the computer makes the announcement. It is therefore possible for you to tell your friends "Candidate Bumble was proclaimed winner at 10:57 pm, when Michigan was called in his favor with 86% of the vote counted."

Returns will come in slower, on a percentage basis, from bigger states. Also, returns countrywide will come in slower the earlier the year of the scenario (methods of counting and transmitting vote totals were slower in the past, and will be increasingly faster in the future).

When the decision is made to get the final results, the computer will figure out how many votes are left to be counted in each state, and then divide up these votes according to each candidate's strength at the end of the final week. Note that this is not the procedure in minute-by-minute coverage. Each minute,

the candidates receive a random gain or loss to their strength (which remains fixed in memory). This way, candidates can suddenly surge or fall back. The final result, however, should be very close to the final strength.

Once in a very rare while, the computer will make an incorrect projection. This will be corrected in the final results, as all states are verified as going one way or another. The chance of a state being miscalled is a tiny fraction of 1%.

III. NOTES ON STRATEGY

A candidate's strategy should be readily apparent — hold on to what you control, grab the undecided, and make inroads into what the opponent controls. Players have great latitude in how to go about doing this; and the variety of perfectly plausible strategies cannot be covered here. Nonetheless, some platitudes bear repetition.

First, plan ahead. Upon seeing the first poll map, you should formulate a game plan of sorts. Determine which regions you will make an effort in. What will be the pace of your spending (saving for a big smash in the final week can be very successful sometimes, and very demoralizing for an opponent who spent like there was no tomorrow in early weeks) . . . what states will be indispensable in putting together a victory . . . what states you would like to force your opponent to fight for.

Second, measure each candidate's strengths and weaknesses. Try to exploit your candidate's and your opponent's. If your candidate is a weak campaigner, use more advertising. If he is strong, campaign actively. If you are a good debator, don't duck debates.

Third, for maximum effectiveness, use all forms of campaigning in a sort of "combined arms" assault. Do not use these methods in states of little importance. The big bucks should be reserved for the big states, particularly those that are close. As a rule of thumb, your effort should roughly equal the equation $\text{Electoral Votes} \times \text{Tightness of the Race}$. It is not unusual for a candidate to throw close to \$1000 units into California in the final week, if the state is a horse race.





Fourth, on campaign swings it is better to hit a state a few times in several different weeks than many times in a few weeks. Also, one should not venture into a region unless at least two states are going to be visited. This is merely for economic reasons — the regional costs of campaigning should be spread out, on the average, over more than one state. Hitting a region piecemeal is not getting the most for your dollar. Sometimes such a move can be justified, however. As an example, making three stops in one state costs \$170 units for a major candidate ($\$45 + 20 + 105 = 170$). Making the same three stops plus one stop in four other states in the region costs \$390 units. ($\$45 + 100 + 245 = 390$). The average cost per stop in the first example is about \$57 units, in the second, \$56 units. For less cost per stop, the candidate receives a much wider, greater impact. Of course, the benefits of these tactics must be weighed against their costs. If a large, crucial state is the only one in a region where the race looks very close, visiting that one state alone may be the better overall decision.

With regard to debating, candidates should not agree to debate unless they feel they have a significant chance of gaining by it. Candidates who are well ahead in the polls have almost no reason to debate their opponents. If a campaign is close, the decision should be based on a realistic appraisal of which candidate is the stronger. If your candidate is weaker, or has significantly less poise there should be no debate. If a candidate is behind and desperate, a debate may be the only gamble with any chance of improving the situation. Likewise, a major candidate should not debate a third-party candidate unless the latter is a serious contender or would make any gains in a debate at the expense of the other major candidate. If a third party candidate is liberal, he is likely to draw votes from the more liberal major candidate (almost without exception the Democrat). No candidate should ever feel intimidated into debating; it should always be a calculated decision (or risk).

Taking a trip is the purest gamble of all. It may work, or it may not. Third-party candidates should not even consider trips unless they are reasonably high in the polls. (This means they won't be

strapped for cash). Risk-averse players are probably best off avoiding trips, because they are more in control of the situation that way. Incumbent Presidents should be much more willing to board Air Force One and take the risk, because no campaign money is involved.

Every election will be slightly different, but some axioms hold true in most every election. The Democratic candidate usually cannot win unless he is successful in the Mid-Atlantic states, which are traditionally more liberal. Likewise, he should try to capture at least some of the Industrial Midwest states, because they are usually very close and are rich in electoral votes. The South is a fickle region (our apologies to the Southerners nice enough to buy this game), because it is normally very conservative but often will swing behind the Democrat if he is from the South or if his running mate is. Also, the South has changed over the years from solidly Democratic to fairly Republican. The segregation issue was of prime importance in turning the South to Goldwater in 1964, despite Lyndon Johnson's being from Texas. Depending on the variables present, the Democrat can sweep the South or be swept in the South. Because of the number of electoral votes involved (130 in 1980 — almost half the number required to win), this is a swing region. The Midwest is generally quite conservative, with the exception of Minnesota. Iowa and Missouri are usually quite close. The Republicans should be able to sweep the rest of these states easily. (They are in trouble if they can't.) The Western states are consistently Republican — this region can almost be written off by any Democrat, particularly in the more recent elections. States like Utah, Idaho, and Arizona are virtually hopeless for any liberal presidential candidate. The Pacific Coast is, of course, dominated by California, which possesses more electoral votes than all the other states in the region combined. These states can go either way, and can be won by either

candidate in most situations. Usually, the stronger effort will carry the day. However, Hawaii usually goes Democratic, and Alaska is usually Republican.

Republican strategy is, from the above, fairly evident. If they hang onto the Western states, avoid a Democratic sweep in the South, and pick off several states in the Mid-Atlantic and Industrial Midwest regions, they should be able to win. Strategy is a little easier for the Republican candidate, because his strong regions are so solidly in support he hardly need worry about them.

A third-party candidate in almost every situation faces a quixotic struggle. Except in the most extreme circumstances (e.g., the country is in turmoil, the major candidates are buffoons, the third party candidate is another Alexander the Great, etc.), he hasn't a ghost of a chance of winning the election. The function of a third-party candidate is primarily to wreck the support of one of the major party candidates. Had George Wallace not run in 1968, it would never have been as close as it was: he cut into Nixon's constituency. Had John Anderson not run in 1980, Carter would still have lost, but not by so wide a margin. Certainly Carter would have picked up states like Massachusetts and New York, which traditionally are Democratic. Playing the manager of the third party candidate has few psychic rewards, and is often best played by the computer. A third-party candidate who can hold 15% of the vote on election day should claim a moral victory.

When the computer runs its campaigns, it incorporates all the advice given in this section into its multifarious decision routines. The computer, however, lacks one crucial element — the human touch. Although its weekly tactics are usually sound, they lack context. The computer, in short, has no carefully thought-out strategy. It merely attacks targets of opportunity as they arise. While this is a good, safe strategy, it is not necessarily the best one. A good, experienced player has an edge over the computer, at least as far as making campaign decisions is concerned. When you are just beginning to gain experience, watching how the computer operates through the intelligence reports may be valuable.





IV. SUMMARY OF THE ELECTIONS 1960–1980

1960

Vice-President Richard Nixon was the logical candidate to follow President Eisenhower into the White House. While many in the country were tired of the peaceful, if uninspired leadership during the previous eight years, Nixon was well ahead in the polls as the campaign against John Kennedy began. There are several reasons for his very narrow defeat, some mentioned in his book *Six Crises*. For example, in August, when President Eisenhower was asked by reporters what role the Vice President had played in any of the important decisions in his term in office, Eisenhower said "give me a week and I'll think of one [of Nixon's suggestions that was used]". The Democrats were delighted by the response which diluted Nixon's claim of greater experience than Kennedy's. At the convention, Nixon had pledged to visit "all 50 states" during the campaign. This was ill-considered because, while it was dramatic, it was impractical. Forced to abide by his promise, Nixon ended up spending the final weekend of the campaign in Alaska, of all places.

Another blow to the Nixon camp was his coming down with a knee infection at the very start of the campaign. This illness gave Kennedy a boost in the polls, as Nixon was hospitalized for about ten days, unable to campaign.

In the most remembered events of that campaign, Kennedy and Nixon held four debates; Nixon apparently won the last three, but was defeated in the first which had the largest television audience. Not only was Nixon improperly dressed for the appearance (his suit blended into the background), but he was overly deferential to Kennedy, often talking to him instead of to the cameras.

Perhaps most important, Kennedy simply had a more magnetic personality than Nixon. He was younger, more attractive, self-confident, and well connected. The public perceived this.

The election was the closest of the century. Kennedy received only 118,000 votes more than Nixon. 9,000 votes in Illinois and 47,000 votes in Texas would have given Nixon the victory in electoral votes. Hawaii was decided by only 115 votes in Kennedy's favor.

1964

Barry Goldwater's smashing defeat in 1964 is fairly easy to figure out. The country in 1964 was in very good condition, by all reasonable standards. President Kennedy had been very popular, and his assassination gave the Democrats a considerable boost, however inadvertent. Most important, Goldwater was caricatured as a man destroying Social Security cards with one hand, and pressing the nuclear button with the other. His famous dictum "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue" was taken by many as the ends justifying the means. Basically, he scared the daylights out of people at a time when the country was in relatively good condition. He received the nomination much like George McGovern did two elections later — a small, very active, and almost religiously dedicated band of followers outmaneuvered the other, inert elements in the party.

Johnson was not so much a brilliant campaigner as a wily politician, and exploited Goldwater's obvious defects to perfection. That year, it would have been difficult for any of the possible Republican candidates — Nelson Rockefeller, William Scranton, Henry Cabot Lodge, or even Richard Nixon — to have defeated Johnson.

The landslide was one of the biggest in history, ranking with FDR's wallop of Alf Landon in 1936. Goldwater carried five states in the Deep South and his native Arizona, Johnson the rest. The margin of victory was nearly 16,000,000 votes, with Johnson receiving 61.1% of the vote.

1968

LBJ was politically toxic by 1968, and the country was in a turmoil unseen since the Civil War. The cities were in unrest, the war in Vietnam was at its height and rapidly becoming unpopular,

massive antiwar demonstrations were in the news, and campuses were the scene of revolutionary ferment. Martin Luther King was killed in April, Robert Kennedy in June. It was a black year in American history.

Johnson announced at the end of March that he would "neither seek nor accept" the Democratic nomination, throwing the election wide open. In a fierce struggle, Hubert Humphrey, the Vice President, prevailed over the other contenders, most notably Eugene McCarthy, the "peace" candidate. Richard Nixon, with a better organization, took the Republican nomination, beating out Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan, then Governor of California. George Wallace formed the American Independent Party, and ran as a third candidate. The campaign was close all the way to the finish.

The tables had turned from four years earlier. This time, conditions in the country were so poor that the incumbent Democrats lost the advantages of being in power.

Nixon wound up winning by just over 500,000 votes, taking 301 electoral votes. Wallace won five southern states taking 13% of the national vote (heavily concentrated in the South). Some of the keys to the election were Humphrey's failure to win any southern states besides Texas and any states in the Industrial Midwest besides Michigan. Nixon's campaign strategy in this election was, in the final analysis, decisive.

1972

President Nixon's political position was almost impregnable in 1972 after a series of foreign policy successes in the year before the election. In February, he visited China; the first American president to do so. In May, he visited the Soviet Union. Though there had been dissent on the way he had wound down the American involvement in Vietnam, there could be no doubting that American involvement had been significantly reduced and would eventually cease to be a cause of discord. On the domestic front, he had not turned in a sterling performance but matters had not badly deteriorated since the last election.

Against so formidable an incumbent the Democrats were again divided.



George Wallace, up to the time of the attempt in mid-May to assassinate him, did surprisingly well in several Democratic primaries. Hubert Humphrey, seeking the presidency again, also did well. George McGovern and his loyal, well-organized band of extreme liberals eventually pulled the party sharply to the Left after successive wins late in the primary season. Pledging an immediate halt to American involvement in Vietnam, a virtual gutting of the Armed Forces to a level below that which existed on the day of Pearl Harbor, an ill-conceived welfare plan by which every man, woman and child would be entitled to \$1,000 in transfer payments (soaking the rich to feed the poor), and unilateral nuclear disarmament, McGovern represented the most liberal national candidate since Henry Wallace ran on the Progressive ticket in 1948. McGovern was an easy target, and his wealth-redistribution schemes filled Nixon's campaign coffers to overflowing.

Nixon pulled out all stops in getting re-elected, and buried McGovern in November by the largest electoral landslide in history — 521 to 17. Nixon won every state in the nation except Massachusetts, and also lost the District of Columbia. The margins of victory were uniformly overwhelming. Nixon received almost 80% of the vote in Mississippi, a margin approaching what could be expected from an undemocratic country. Unfortunately for Nixon, this mandate bore the seeds of his eventual downfall.

1976

By 1976, the nation was only beginning to recover from the Watergate trauma. President Ford's period in office was brief and not particularly distinguished. He will be remembered for his role in healing the country. In any event, the Republican party was in a shambles, and there was talk of extinction following the Nixon debacle. Ford's position was worsened after an extremely bitter struggle for the nomination against Ronald Reagan, one that was not decided until the night the ballots were cast at the convention. Meanwhile, the Democrats fielded an odd assortment of candidates, among which Jimmy Carter, a relatively

moderate, low key, and obviously sincere man, emerged the strongest. An outsider to national politics, Carter was an enigma wrapped in a mystery to many Americans. Fed up with the Republicans, however, many decided to put their trust in Carter, a man who promised never to lie to them.

Ford started the campaign far behind in the polls, but steadily gained on Carter as the campaign progressed. Then came their remembered debate, in which Ford insisted that Poland was not under Soviet domination. Ford's Polish joke was raked by the press and reviled by conservatives who would have reluctantly voted for him. (Ford's natural constituency was the moderate wing of the Republican party; the conservatives solidly supported Reagan in the primaries.) The campaign faltered. Though Ford continued to close the gap, in the end it was not enough; Carter won 50%-48%. The popular vote margin was a little over 1,500,000 votes. Had 6,000 votes changed hands in Ohio and 4,000 in Hawaii, Ford would have won an electoral victory.

1980

Many things contributed to Ronald Reagan's sweeping victory in 1980, and in hindsight, it is hard to imagine any Republican candidate, short of Nixon, losing to Carter that year. The economy was in recession; the jobless rate was up, inflation hovered for a few months near 18%, the bond market had been wiped out. Carter himself spoke of a "national malaise." On the foreign front, Iran taunted the U.S. month after month with impunity, while a rescue mission to free the hostages became a national tragedy. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in an act of brazen aggression, and the President's response was essentially to punish the nation's farmers and athletes. Granted, many of the events that occurred were out of the President's control, but nonetheless, the nation was uneasy. Carter's leadership, justly or not, was mercilessly criticized in the media. The nation looked at Carter's record in office, and could view only the Camp David accords as a significant achievement.

Enter Ronald Reagan, seeking the presidency for the third and probably last time. Reagan was vulnerable on

many of his positions, and, given different circumstances, could have been caricatured much as Goldwater was in 1964. This time, however, the Democrats had come remarkably close to ousting Carter and replacing him with Kennedy, who certainly better embodied the traditional ideals of the party. The party embraced Carter with reluctance and an obvious lack of enthusiasm. (Ex-Senator Bob Clark of Iowa was witnessed by this writer touring college campuses on behalf of President Carter, starting off his presentation with "I know Jimmy Carter is a SORRY Democratic candidate for President, but think of the alternative — Ronald Reagan (pained expression) . . ."). Reagan, who buried his Republican opponents in the primaries with an awesome regularity, spoke brilliantly at the convention before a crowd drunk with victory.

The campaign was a bitter struggle to the very end. The pollsters gave Reagan a slight edge throughout, and were later embarrassed by their final predictions of "too close to call."

The highlight of the campaign was the single debate held on October 28th, one week before the election. On points, most everyone agreed the debate was a standoff. Reagan's self-confidence and casual ridicule of some of the charges made by Carter made the difference. Where Carter needed to successfully paint Reagan as an irresponsible extremist, his efforts failed, above all because of Reagan's communicative skills which far exceeded those of Carter. Reagan never stumbled, while Carter made a maladroit reference to his daughter Amy in connection with nuclear proliferation. In sum, the debate, plus suddenly raised and dashed hopes about returning the hostages from Iran, destroyed Carter's support in the final week. He went down to a humiliating defeat.

Carter only carried six states, plus the District of Columbia. The final electoral count was 489 to 49. The margin of victory was nearly 10,000,000 votes. John B. Anderson, running on an Independent ticket, received over 5,000,000 votes and 7% of all votes cast. His strength steadily eroded after the conventions, and in the end, the main effect of his candidacy was to deepen the size of the landslide.



Alabama 11
Alaska 3
Arizona 4
Arkansas 8
California 32
Colorado 6
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 10
Georgia 12
Hawaii 3
Idaho 4
Illinois 27
Indiana 13
Iowa 10
Kansas 8
Kentucky 10
Louisiana 10
Maine 5
Maryland 9

Electoral votes for each state

1960

Massachusetts 16
Michigan 20
Minnesota 11
Mississippi 8
Missouri 13
Montana 4
Nebraska 6
Nevada 3
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 16



New Mexico 4
New York 45
North Carolina 14
North Dakota 4
Ohio 25
Oklahoma 8
Oregon 6
Pennsylvania 32
Rhode Island 4
South Carolina 8
South Dakota 4
Tennessee 11
Texas 24
Utah 4
Vermont 3
Virginia 12
Washington 9
West Virginia 8
Wisconsin 12
Wyoming 3

Electoral votes for each state

1964



Alabama 10
Alaska 3
Arizona 5
Arkansas 6
California 40
Colorado 6
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 14
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 26
Indiana 13
Iowa 9
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Massachusetts 14
Michigan 21
Minnesota 10
Mississippi 7
Missouri 12
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 17

Electoral votes for each state

1968

New Mexico 4
New York 43
North Carolina 13
North Dakota 4
Ohio 26
Oklahoma 8
Oregon 6
Pennsylvania 29
Rhode Island 4
South Carolina 8
South Dakota 4
Tennessee 11
Texas 26
Utah 4
Vermont 3
Virginia 12
Washington 9
West Virginia 7
Wisconsin 12
Wyoming 3

Alabama 10
Alaska 3
Arizona 5
Arkansas 6
California 40
Colorado 6
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 14
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 26
Indiana 13
Iowa 9
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Massachusetts 14
Michigan 21
Minnesota 10
Mississippi 7
Missouri 12
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 17




Alabama 9
Alaska 3
Arizona 6
Arkansas 6
California 45
Colorado 7
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 17
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 26
Indiana 13
Iowa 8
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Maryland 10

Electoral votes for each state

1972

Massachusetts 14
Michigan 21
Minnesota 10
Mississippi 7
Missouri 12
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 17



Alabama 9
Alaska 3
Arizona 6
Arkansas 6
California 45
Colorado 7
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 17
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 26
Indiana 13
Iowa 8
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Maryland 10

Electoral votes for each state

1976

Massachusetts 14
Michigan 21
Minnesota 10
Mississippi 7
Missouri 12
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 17

New Mexico 4
New York 41
North Carolina 13
North Dakota 3
Ohio 25
Oklahoma 8
Oregon 6
Pennsylvania 27
Rhode Island 4
South Carolina 8
South Dakota 4
Tennessee 10
Texas 26
Utah 4
Vermont 3
Virginia 12
Washington 9
West Virginia 6
Wisconsin 11
Wyoming 3



Alabama 9
Alaska 3
Arizona 6
Arkansas 6
California 45
Colorado 7
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 17
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 26
Indiana 13
Iowa 8
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Massachusetts 16
Michigan 20
Minnesota 11
Mississippi 7
Missouri 12
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 17

Electoral votes for each state

1980

New Mexico 4
New York 41
North Carolina 13
North Dakota 3
Ohio 25
Oklahoma 8
Oregon 6
Pennsylvania 27
Rhode Island 4
South Carolina 8
South Dakota 4
Tennessee 10
Texas 26
Utah 4
Vermont 3
Virginia 12
Washington 9
West Virginia 6
Wisconsin 11
Wyoming 3



Alabama 9
Alaska 3
Arizona 7
Arkansas 6
California 47
Colorado 8
Connecticut 8
Delaware 3
Florida 21
Georgia 12
Hawaii 4
Idaho 4
Illinois 24
Indiana 12
Iowa 8
Kansas 7
Kentucky 9
Louisiana 10
Maine 4
Maryland 10

Electoral votes for each state

1984

Massachusetts 13
Michigan 20
Minnesota 10
Mississippi 7
Missouri 11
Montana 4
Nebraska 5
New Hampshire 4
New Jersey 16

New Mexico 5
New York 36
North Carolina 13
North Dakota 3
Ohio 23
Oklahoma 8
Oregon 7
Pennsylvania 25
Rhode Island 4
South Carolina 8
South Dakota 3
Tennessee 11
Texas 29
Utah 5
Vermont 3
Virginia 12
Washington 10
West Virginia 6
Wisconsin 11
Wyoming 3



■ Democratic
■ Republican
□ Independent





PRESIDENT ELECT™

SHORT RULES

INTRODUCTION. **PRESIDENT ELECT** is a comprehensive simulation of presidential campaigning from labor day to election night. Game functions are rooted as closely as possible to real life; to campaign, players must plan and execute strategies of their own choosing. Success in a campaign is a function of these strategies, the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the candidates, chance events, and the pre-campaign situation.

THE SET-UP. To begin play, insert the game disk into your drive and turn on the computer. The first question will ask you whether you wish to 1) start a new game, 2) continue a saved game, 3) demonstrate the graphics, 4) have the computer demo the game by playing the 1960 campaign without player participation. After choosing the indicated option you will be asked whether you have a color or black-and-white monitor. Subsequent questions are self-explanatory.

If you have selected a new game, you must construct your own scenario. The importance of this segment cannot be overstressed, as the variables you enter have a direct and powerful influence on the course of the game. To construct a scenario, answer each question as requested on the screen and refer to the game manual when necessary. Following are a few notes on setting up a scenario:

- 1) Election years are different in two ways. First, the number of popular and electoral votes conform to history, adjusted in the case of popular votes by likely voter turnout. For example, Florida has 10 electoral votes in 1960 and 21 in 1984, due to population shifts. Second, each state is biased to a different degree for one party or another. Massachusetts is much more liberal than Utah. This bias changes from election to election.
- 2) Historical scenarios are just that — the historical candidates and conditions are entered automatically. A historical scenario gives you the ability to change conditions and candidates, even to the point of constructing a fictitious candidate. This allows YOU to run for president.
- 3) Candidates can be selected irrespective of their party or actual time frame, however unrealistic George McGovern running as a Republican in 1984 may seem.
- 4) How the state of the union affects the campaign depends upon who is the incumbent, how the state of the union was when the incumbent party took office, and how good or bad current conditions are.

The computer can manage all, some, or none of the candidates. It will make the game decisions a human must, without cheating. If you want all candidates to be run by the computer, then you can run the simulation on "autopilot". The campaigning segment will take 45-60 minutes without any player inputs required. You regain control when the election returns begin.

THE GAME. The campaign is nine weeks (turns) long. Each week players receive a poll that shows the national popular vote with a 2% margin of error (on rare occasions the

error may be greater). The individual states have a 4% margin of error. For a state to be considered likely to vote for a candidate the polls must show the candidate leading by over 4%. For a state to be considered solidly in support of a candidate the candidate must be leading by over 8%. During the campaign the candidates try to improve their positions through the expenditure of campaign funds on overhead, advertising, campaign stops, and foreign travel.

OVERHEAD. Overhead is unavoidable; for major candidates overhead starts at \$500 units a week and increases by \$100 units each week. It does not contribute directly to swaying votes, but is essential in running a campaign. Overhead is variable for third-party candidates.

ADVERTISING. There are three kinds of advertising, each serving a different purpose:

- 1) National advertising covers the entire nation. Dollar-for-dollar it sways the most net votes; however, it is not focused and is not the most effective way to swing particular states.
- 2) Regional advertising is more effective in swaying states, but only in the region chosen.
- 3) Individual state advertising is excellent for swaying large states where the voting is close, but it is a very expensive way to buy votes. To select a state, enter its two-letter postal code shown on the map.

CAMPAIGN STOPS. Each candidate may make appearances in the states/regions of his choice. Costs are incurred when entering a region, when entering a given state, and for each stop made. Fatigue effects occur after a given number of stops, and no more than a given number of stops may be scheduled for a single week. Stops have a diminishing marginal effectiveness in a given week, but have a gradually increasing effectiveness each week (e.g., 2 stops in each of three weeks is more effective than 6 stops in one week, but is also more expensive).

FOREIGN VISITS. In the first week only, all candidates decide whether to take a trip, and if so who will go, where they will go, when, and for how long. Trips are a pure gamble; sometimes they help, sometimes they hurt.

All players receive an intelligence report at the end of the campaign phase, showing an estimate of each candidate's dollar expenditures in each state. Also shown are the number of stops made by each candidate in each state.

Each week the players are offered the opportunity to debate, if they are willing. Agreement comes only through the mutual consent among potential debaters on who will debate and how many questions will be asked.

At the end of each week, strengths are adjusted based on the decisions of the candidates and the events that have transpired. Each new week begins with a new poll.

ELECTION NIGHT. After the ninth week, the results of the election are given and a winner declared. The election night may be simulated in real time (4-6 hours) or the votes may be tallied in less than 15 seconds. The players are given the opportunity to decide how to resolve the election night.

REPUBLICANS

NAME	SOCIAL VIEWS	ECONOMIC VIEWS	FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS	OVERALL	SPEAKING ABILITY	MAGNETISM	POISE	HOME STATE
ANDERSON, JOHN	68	30	55	51	8	6	7	IL
BAKER, HOWARD	28	32	36	32	5	5	6	TN
BUCKLEY, JAMES	3	9	10	7	7	4	7	CT
BUSH, GEORGE	21	22	27	23	5	4	5	CT
CONNALLY, JOHN	7	7	16	10	8	5	6	TX
CRANE, PHIL	3	2	15	7	5	4	3	IL
DOLE, ROBERT	10	10	12	10	4	2	3	KS
FORD, GERALD	22	25	17	21	4	4	5	MI
HAIG, ALEXANDER	8	10	3	7	3	3	3	PA
HATCH, ORRIN	7	8	10	8	5	3	7	UT
HELMS, JESSE	0	1	2	1	4	1	4	NC
GOLDWATER, BARRY	1	5	7	4	5	4	5	AZ
KEMP, JACK	12	3	22	12	7	7	5	NY
LAXALT, PAUL	9	8	12	10	5	3	6	NV
LINDSAY, JOHN	93	93	80	84	4	5	5	NY
LUGAR, RICHARD	15	12	22	17	5	6	5	IN
NIXON, RICHARD	39	41	30	36	6	5	8	CA
REAGAN, RONALD	10	4	10	8	8	8	7	CA
ROCKEFELLER, NELSON	40	30	40	36	5	4	6	NY
SCRANTON, WILLIAM	27	32	15	25	5	5	5	PA
THOMPSON, JIM	26	21	28	25	5	4	6	IL
WEICKER, LOWELL	78	57	74	70	6	3	4	CT

DEMOCRATS

NAME	SOCIAL VIEWS	ECONOMIC VIEWS	FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS	OVERALL	SPEAKING ABILITY	MAGNETISM	POISE	HOME STATE
BRADLEY, BILL	79	63	71	71	6	7	7	NJ
BROWN, JERRY	82	40	86	69	4	4	4	CA
BROWN, JOHN	61	56	55	57	5	6	6	KY
BYRD, ROBERT	79	64	65	69	6	6	8	WV
CARTER, JIMMY	59	59	65	61	3	4	8	GA
CHISHOLM, SHIRLEY	97	100	98	98	6	3	3	NY
HUMPHREY, HUBERT	91	79	85	85	5	5	7	MN
JACKSON, HENRY	54	42	31	42	4	2	7	WA
JOHNSON, LYNDON	78	66	38	60	5	6	9	TX
KENNEDY, JOHN	84	57	37	59	7	8	7	MA
KENNEDY, ROBERT	91	82	70	81	7	8	8	NY
KENNEDY, TED	92	86	87	88	7	7	5	MA
McCarthy, Eugene	86	81	97	88	4	7	7	MN
McGOVERN, GEORGE	94	77	95	89	4	3	5	SD
MONDALE, WALTER	92	83	84	86	6	5	6	MN
MOYNIHAN, D. PATRICK	59	62	46	56	8	4	8	NY
MUSKIE, ED	82	75	74	77	4	5	4	ME
ROCKEFELLER, JAY	75	65	69	70	2	4	5	WV
UDALL, MO	72	74	82	76	3	4	5	AZ
WALLACE, GEORGE	11	36	8	18	6	6	4	AL
YOUNG, ANDREW	97	96	98	97	6	6	1	GA

THIRD PARTY

CLARK, ED	28	0	62	30	2	2	5	CA
COMMONER, BARRY	97	95	93	95	3	2	3	MA